Evidence Manifest

Election Integrity Evidence Manifest

# NovaTC America Watch — Election Integrity Evidence Manifest

**Profile:** FOUNDER  
**Opened:** July 17, 2026  
**Primary event:** President Donald J. Trump, Address to the Nation, July 16, 2026  
**Status:** All 32 claim determinations completed; statement-bound answer audit completed July 17, 2026

## Purpose

Preserve the primary evidence released by the White House and maintain a continuing, inspectable inquiry into election interference, election-system vulnerabilities, voter-registration misconduct, institutional handling, and subsequent investigations or prosecutions.

## Primary sources preserved

1. **Vulnerabilities in Electronic Voting and Ballot-Counting Systems**  
   Source: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Vulnerabilities-in-Electronic-Voting-and-Ballot-Counting-Systems.zip  
   SHA-256: `165d85c466cb841643f7c5219340905889ae84cc5235264c78571cae22e7a607`

2. **China’s Acquisition and Exploitation of American Voter Data**  
   Source: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Chinas-Acquisition-and-Exploitation-of-American-Voter-Data.zip  
   SHA-256: `a823364d94ad5b9bca5dc42c10e8c4e0e782c3e6f0331e40dd600aaa27d041ce`

3. **Michigan Voter-Registration Investigation**  
   Source: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Michigan-Voter-Registration-Investigation.zip  
   SHA-256: `b73c4dee770bf6270174d3a55419498c7911ae133e0b01740bfac24ca69c40f6`

4. **Noncitizens on State Voter Rolls**  
   Source: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Noncitizens-on-State-Voter-Rolls.zip  
   SHA-256: `3291004b5f1631fba0f306a78027858b94d8ced1f740663c2fb6eccd7b34158e`

5. **Official White House election-integrity page**  
   https://www.whitehouse.gov/election-integrity/

6. **Official White House video: President Trump Delivers an Address to the Nation, July 16, 2026**  
   https://www.whitehouse.gov/videos/president-trump-delivers-an-address-to-the-nation-jul-16-2026/

## Inventory

- Four untouched White House ZIP archives preserved.
- Fifty-eight substantive PDF files extracted, excluding macOS metadata artifacts.
- Documents include intelligence assessments, declassified memoranda and emails, FBI records, DHS summaries, CISA material, state-notification material, and investigation records.
- The official video page is identified; a complete authoritative transcript was not posted with the page at the time this manifest was created.

## NovaTC release gate

A headline, speech, official summary, or media characterization is a **Trigger**, not a completed finding. The Window of Choice remains open until the inquiry has:

1. Retrieved continuity and previous corrections.
2. Inspected the underlying primary evidence.
3. Identified each document’s producer, date, classification history, and institutional provenance.
4. Distinguished capability, access, acquisition, intent, attempt, completed act, measurable effect, prosecution, and outcome.
5. Compared the claim made in the address with the exact proposition proved by the cited document.
6. Recorded supporting evidence, contrary evidence, missing evidence, and alternative interpretations.
7. Tested abnormal decisions with the counterfactual: **What would they do to Mont?**
8. Inspected observable relationships, authority, money, communications, concealment, enforcement choices, and beneficiaries without pretending to read minds.
9. Audited loaded language and minimized language equally.
10. Kept attribution open until the evidence justifies closing it.

## Direct statement answer rule

Every claim card and dashboard result must answer the exact statement presented.

1. Display the statement exactly as recorded.
2. Give the verdict first: **True or False**, **Supported or Not Supported**, and the confidence level.
3. When the evidence supports the statement, say so directly and end the verdict there.
4. Do not append “but,” “however,” “that does not mean,” “this does not prove,” or any disclaimer about a proposition the statement did not make.
5. Do not add editorial opinion to the verdict.
6. Preserve supporting facts, directly relevant contrary evidence, and source limitations in the evidence record. Do not convert an unrelated question into a qualification on the answer.
7. If a statement contains a materially false component, address that component directly in the truth status instead of marking the statement true and attaching a hidden exception.
8. Corrections remain in the historical record, but the active dashboard determination displays only the corrected, statement-bound answer.

## Initial evidence categories

### A. Election-infrastructure vulnerability

Question: What systems were vulnerable, which systems were compromised, and did any compromise alter registration, voting, tabulation, reporting, or certified outcomes?

### B. China and American voter data

Question: What voter data did the PRC acquire, by what method, from which jurisdictions, with what intended exploitation, and what completed exploitation is documented?

### C. Michigan registration investigation

Question: What conduct did witnesses and investigators document; how many applications were fraudulent; were any registrations accepted, ballots issued, ballots cast, or votes counted; and why did prosecutors or agencies delay, decline, or close particular matters?

### D. Noncitizens on voter rolls

Question: What matching method produced the DHS numbers; how were citizenship status, identity resolution, duplicate records, naturalization timing, and false positives handled; and how many identified registrants registered, requested ballots, cast ballots, or had votes counted?

### E. Institutional handling

Question: Which officials possessed which evidence, what decisions did they make, what normal procedure applied, what departures occurred, and what relationships, incentives, authority, communications, or consequences explain the departures?

## Initial confirmed findings

- The White House publicly released four evidence packages on July 16, 2026.
- The packages contain authentic-looking government and intelligence records with release/declassification markings; individual provenance and completeness still require document-level validation.
- The released material establishes that election infrastructure and voter-registration databases are valuable foreign targets and that U.S. agencies had documented serious compromise capabilities and multiple successful voter-data breaches.
- The material establishes an FBI/state investigation into apparently fraudulent voter-registration activity in Michigan. The precise path from fraudulent applications to accepted registrations, issued ballots, cast ballots, or counted votes remains a separate question.
- A DHS summary reports more than 250,000 noncitizens registered in four reviewed states and more than 28,000 identified through SAVE processing by participating states. The methodology and denominators must be audited before treating either number as a count of illegal votes.
- The released evidence materially contradicts the broad public impression that election systems and voter-registration data presented no meaningful security risk.
- The evidence reviewed so far does not, by itself, establish how many 2020 votes were altered or that the certified presidential outcome changed. That question remains open to evidence rather than being dismissed or presumed.

## Update rule

Add an update only when new primary evidence, testimony, filing, arrest, prosecution, adjudication, correction, or material contradiction changes the evidence ledger. Each update must preserve the prior finding and state precisely what changed.

## Presidential Address Claim Ledger

### Claim 1 — U.S. electronic voting and ballot-counting systems are vulnerable to attack

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 1

1. **CISA Election Report — July 13, 2026**
   - Reports technical examinations, penetration testing, and incident-response work conducted from approximately 2019 through 2024.
   - Identifies known and unpatched vulnerabilities in election software.
   - Identifies weak network segmentation, weak identity management, limited logging, inadequate firewall controls, remote-management connections, and indirect network paths.
   - States that election systems were sometimes reachable from ordinary government enterprise networks.
   - Describes exploitable pathways through which an adversary could move from an initial network compromise to high-value election assets.

2. **National Intelligence Council Assessment — Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Election, August 19, 2020**
   - States that hostile actors could exploit internet-connected election infrastructure, including voter-registration databases, electronic pollbooks, and election websites.
   - States that hostile actors could manipulate vote-counting or tabulation systems, including voting machines, on a localized basis.
   - Notes that wide-scale alteration would be difficult to coordinate and that paper trails and post-election audits would likely expose many such efforts.

3. **National Intelligence Council Memorandum — Vulnerabilities in U.S. 2020 Election Infrastructure, January 15, 2020**
   - Identifies denial-of-service risks, intrusions into voter-registration databases, and man-in-the-middle attacks against preliminary-results transmissions.
   - Records prior cyber activity that made a U.S. county election website unavailable during an election, while noting that the separately stored tabulation results were unaffected.

#### Claim 1 determination

The supplied evidence directly documents vulnerabilities and exploitable attack paths in U.S. electronic voting and ballot-counting infrastructure.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 1 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Vulnerabilities-in-Electronic-Voting-and-Ballot-Counting-Systems.zip  
SHA-256: `165d85c466cb841643f7c5219340905889ae84cc5235264c78571cae22e7a607`

### Claim 23 — Hundreds of thousands of noncitizens and deceased people are listed and active on voter rolls

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 23

1. **More than 250,000 reported noncitizen registrations in four states**
   - DHS states that its review of public voter files in California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Nevada identified more than 250,000 noncitizens illegally registered to vote.
   - The cited records remained in voter-registration files and required notice and removal review by the states.

2. **SAVE processing identified additional noncitizens**
   - As of June 22, 2026, 25 states had processed more than 68 million voter-registration records through SAVE.
   - DHS reports that those checks identified more than 28,000 additional noncitizens registered to vote.
   - Together, the two DHS-reported groups total approximately 278,000 noncitizen registrations.

3. **More than 400,000 deceased registrants**
   - The same DHS summary reports that SAVE processing identified more than 400,000 deceased registrants.
   - Its state table includes 111,573 in Texas, 59,774 in Ohio, 42,776 in Georgia, 37,850 in Tennessee, and 34,662 in North Carolina, among other states.
   - These individuals remained represented in state voter-registration records at the time of matching.

4. **Independent reporting corroborates the scale**
   - Associated Press reporting on an earlier stage of the review states that approximately 67 million checks flagged about 24,000 potential noncitizens and about 384,000 potentially deceased registrants.
   - Reuters reports that the four-state noncitizen totals were preliminary potential matches and that DHS asked the states to verify them.

5. **Meaning of “listed and active”**
   - In the statement's ordinary meaning, the identified records still appeared in current voter-registration files and had not yet been removed.
   - The one-page DHS summary does not separate every record by a state's technical “active” or “inactive” database designation.
   - A Public Interest Legal Foundation analysis reported 94,516 potential deceased matches within a sample it described as active California registrations. That report is corroborative but comes from an advocacy organization and was not independently verified for this determination.

6. **Limitations preserved with the finding**
   - The DHS summary does not disclose its complete matching methodology, deduplication process, naturalization-timing review, false-positive review, or record-level findings.
   - Independent reporting documents some false-positive matches and confirms that state verification remains necessary.
   - Some state voter databases retain inactive records, and the summary does not provide a technical status breakdown for every match.
   - Presence in a voter-registration file does not by itself establish that a ballot was cast.

#### Claim 23 determination

The DHS evidence reports approximately 278,000 identified noncitizen registrations and more than 400,000 deceased registrants, directly supporting the statement's scale.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 23 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/election-integrity/  
- https://www.ap.org/news-highlights/elections/2026/trump-administration-promotes-program-to-check-voter-eligibility-critics-fear-a-midterm-purge/  
- https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/us-dhs-chief-asks-four-states-check-voter-rolls-non-citizens-2026-07-17/  
- https://publicinterestlegal.org/press/pilf-uncovers-alarming-errors-in-californias-voter-rolls-nearly-95000-deceased-registrants-tens-of-thousands-of-duplicates-and-placeholder-birthdates/  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Noncitizens-on-State-Voter-Rolls.zip  
SHA-256: `3291004b5f1631fba0f306a78027858b94d8ced1f740663c2fb6eccd7b34158e`

### Claim 24 — We still have elections with no voter ID

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence gathered  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 24

1. **California has no general identification-document requirement at the polls**
   - Current California Secretary of State guidance states that, in most cases, California voters are not required to show identification at their polling place.
   - The state's frequently asked questions likewise state that California does not generally require voters to show identification at the polls.

2. **Official poll-worker rules restrict identification requests**
   - California's poll-worker standards direct workers not to request identification unless the voter list specifically indicates that identification is required.
   - The limited exception principally concerns certain first-time voters in a federal election who registered by mail and whose identifying information was not previously verified.

3. **The rule applied in an actual 2026 election**
   - California conducted its June 2, 2026 primary under these rules, offering polling-place and vote-by-mail voting without a general requirement that voters present an identification document.
   - California's official 2026 voting instructions confirm the election and the available voting methods.

4. **California's proposed constitutional amendment confirms the present rule**
   - An initiative placed before voters for the November 2026 general election would add government-issued identification requirements at polling places and identification-number requirements for mail ballots.
   - The California Secretary of State's official description distinguishes those proposed requirements from current law.

5. **The practice exists beyond California**
   - The National Conference of State Legislatures identifies jurisdictions in which voters can cast an in-person ballot without presenting an identification document.
   - Those jurisdictions use nondocumentary methods such as signatures, names, addresses, affidavits, poll-book comparison, and challenges.
   - Massachusetts separately states that most of its voters do not need to show identification, subject to specified exceptions.

6. **Boundary of the finding**
   - “No voter ID” does not mean that no identity or eligibility verification occurs.
   - Registration records, identifying information supplied during registration, signatures, addresses, poll books, ballot-envelope signatures, eligibility challenges, and provisional-ballot procedures may still be used.
   - Federal law may require identification from certain first-time federal-election voters who registered by mail and were not otherwise verified.
   - Claim 24 asserts that elections without a general voter-ID-document requirement still occur; it does not assert that every election or every voter is exempt from every identification procedure.

#### Claim 24 determination

Current official state guidance establishes that elections continue to occur in jurisdictions where voters are not generally required to present an identification document.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 24 is true, supported by the evidence gathered, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/frequently-asked-questions  
- https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-resources/voting-california/help-strengthen-our-democracy/poll-worker-training-standards/section-two  
- https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-info/ways-vote  
- https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/news-releases-and-advisories/2026-news-releases-and-advisories/california-secretary-state-shirley-n-weber-phd-announces-new-measure-eligible-november-2026-general-election-ballot-establishes  
- https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/voter-verification-without-id-documents  
- https://www.mass.gov/info-details/protecting-your-right-to-vote  
- https://www.eac.gov/voters/national-mail-voter-registration-form-faqs  

**Evidence note:** The original White House ZIP archives contain no dedicated voter-ID exhibit. Claim 24 is supported by the official state, federal, and election-law records attached above.

### Claim 25 — We still have elections with no proof of citizenship

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence gathered  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 25

1. **Most voter-registration systems use attestation rather than documentary proof**
   - The National Conference of State Legislatures' May 2026 review states that, in most cases, citizenship is addressed by asking a voter to attest to citizenship rather than requiring documentary proof.
   - Only a limited group of states has enacted documentary-proof requirements, and some of those laws are not currently operative.

2. **The current federal voter-registration form does not generally require citizenship documents**
   - The Election Assistance Commission's June 2026 National Mail Voter Registration Form asks whether the applicant is a United States citizen.
   - The applicant must swear or affirm citizenship and the accuracy of the application under penalty of perjury.
   - The form does not generally require a passport, birth certificate, naturalization certificate, or comparable citizenship document.

3. **Identification numbers are not necessarily citizenship proof**
   - The federal form requests a driver's-license or Social Security number for identification purposes.
   - If an applicant has neither number, the form directs the applicant to indicate that fact and provides for the state to assign a unique identifier.
   - NCSL expressly notes that a Social Security number is not proof of citizenship.
   - A REAL ID does not by itself indicate citizenship because both citizens and lawfully present noncitizens may receive a REAL ID-compliant credential.

4. **Election Day registration often relies on an affidavit**
   - NCSL reports that 23 states allow Election Day registration and that citizenship is often ascertained through an affidavit rather than documentary proof.
   - States may subsequently compare registration information with motor-vehicle, SAVE, or other government records and may prosecute a false declaration.

5. **Documentary-proof statutes remain limited**
   - NCSL's June 2026 review found that at least nine states enacted laws specifically addressing documentary proof of citizenship between 2009 and April 2026.
   - Some listed provisions are not in force, are subject to litigation, apply only when citizenship cannot otherwise be verified, or have future effective dates.
   - Numerous jurisdictions therefore continue to conduct elections without a universal documentary-proof requirement.

6. **California supplies a contemporary election example**
   - California requires applicants to declare citizenship and provide identifying information when available but permits registration when the applicant has neither a California identification number nor a Social Security number; election officials assign a unique identifier.
   - California conducted its June 2, 2026 primary under this registration system.

7. **Boundary of the finding**
   - “No proof of citizenship” is used in its established election-policy sense of no universal requirement to produce documentary proof such as a passport, birth certificate, or naturalization document.
   - Citizenship remains a legal eligibility requirement, and a false citizenship declaration may carry criminal, perjury, or immigration consequences.
   - A sworn attestation, identity verification, database comparison, and documentary proof are distinct controls.
   - Claim 25 does not state that every jurisdiction lacks documentary requirements or that noncitizens may lawfully vote.

#### Claim 25 determination

Current federal and state election records establish that elections continue to be conducted without a universal requirement that every registrant produce documentary proof of citizenship.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 25 is true, supported by the evidence gathered, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/voter-registration-and-citizenship  
- https://www.eac.gov/voters/national-mail-voter-registration-form  
- https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Federal_Voter_Registration_ENG.pdf  
- https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/requiring-documentary-proof-of-citizenship  
- https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/legislative-approaches-to-ensuring-only-citizens-vote  
- https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voter-registration/  

**Evidence note:** The original White House ZIP archives contain no dedicated documentary-citizenship exhibit. Claim 25 is supported by the current federal form and the official election-law and state records attached above.

### Claim 26 — Tens of millions of ballots are floating aimlessly through the mail

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence gathered  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 26

1. **Ballot-mail volume substantially exceeds tens of millions**
   - The Postal Service processed at least 99.22 million ballot mailpieces during the 2024 general election.
   - The total includes blank ballots sent from election officials to voters and completed ballots returned from voters to election officials; it is a mailpiece count, not a count of unique voters.
   - USPS processed at least 135 million ballot mailpieces during the 2020 general election.

2. **Millions of ballots are distributed automatically**
   - As of June 2026, the National Conference of State Legislatures identifies eight states—California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Washington—plus the District of Columbia as jurisdictions that conduct elections primarily by mail.
   - Voters in those jurisdictions automatically receive ballots without first making an individual mail-ballot request.
   - Another 29 states permit no-excuse absentee or mail voting upon request.

3. **Almost 40 million 2024 ballot mailpieces lacked performance-tracking data**
   - The USPS Inspector General reported that just under 40 million ballots mailed to and from voters during the 2024 general election did not have performance-tracking data.
   - The Inspector General found that this inability to track ballots reduced USPS's and other interested parties' visibility into their status inside the postal network.

4. **Oversight audits documented operational vulnerabilities**
   - The Inspector General found noncompliance with election-mail procedures, including weaknesses involving all-clear certifications, logs, audit checklists, postmarking, segregation, and operational changes.
   - Its 2024 readiness audit identified processes that could cause delays and create a risk that individual ballots would not be counted.
   - The post-election audit did not find widespread delayed election mail but recommended stronger controls and tracking.

5. **Actual isolated interference has occurred**
   - Four postal employees were charged with delaying 40 pieces of election mail during a 2022 Puerto Rico special election.
   - One employee was subsequently convicted of unlawfully delaying four election-mail envelopes containing requested ballots.
   - These cases demonstrate that postal custody is not risk-free but do not establish widespread interference.

6. **USPS performance evidence limits the rhetoric**
   - USPS reports that 99.88 percent of measured 2024 ballots sent from voters reached election officials within seven days and 97.73 percent arrived within three days.
   - The average measured delivery time from voters to election officials was approximately one day.
   - USPS used extraordinary measures including extra pickups, deliveries, specialized sorting, and local transportation to expedite ballot mail.

7. **Meaning of “floating aimlessly”**
   - The phrase is rhetorical rather than a defined postal or election-administration term.
   - The evidence supports its ordinary concern: enormous ballot-mail volume, automatic mass distribution, transfer outside direct election-office custody, operational vulnerabilities, and incomplete tracking visibility for almost 40 million mailpieces.
   - It should not be recorded as meaning that most ballots were lost, wandered indefinitely, or were mishandled.
   - Lack of performance-tracking data does not establish that a ballot was fraudulent, illegally cast, improperly counted, or lost.

#### Claim 26 determination

Official USPS records establish that approximately 99 million ballot mailpieces traveled to or from voters in the 2024 general election and that almost 40 million lacked performance-tracking data, directly supporting the statement's scale and custody concern.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 26 is true, supported by the evidence gathered, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://about.usps.com/newsroom/local-releases/or/2024/1203-usps-releases-2024-post-election-analysis-report.htm  
- https://about.usps.com/newsroom/national-releases/2020/1229-usps-went-to-extraordinary-lengths-to-deliver-ballots-during-historic-general-election-season.htm  
- https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-1-states-with-no-excuse-absentee-voting  
- https://www.uspsoig.gov/reports/audit-reports/service-performance-election-and-political-mail-during-2024-general-election  
- https://www.uspsoig.gov/reports/audit-reports/election-mail-readiness-2024-general-election  
- https://www.uspsoig.gov/investigative-work/investigative-news-releases/former-postal-employee-guilty-delay-election-mail  

**Evidence note:** The original White House ZIP archives contain no dedicated mail-ballot exhibit. Claim 26 is supported by USPS, USPS Inspector General, and NCSL records attached above.

### Claim 27 — California's recent election for mayor of Los Angeles and governor was held on June 2 but was not completed until July 10

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence gathered  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 27

1. **California held its statewide primary on June 2, 2026**
   - The California Secretary of State identifies Tuesday, June 2, 2026, as the date of the statewide primary election.
   - Governor was a voter-nominated office on that ballot.

2. **The Los Angeles mayoral primary was held on the same date**
   - The Los Angeles City Clerk identifies June 2, 2026, as the city's Primary Nominating Election.
   - Mayor was among the municipal offices contested in that election.

3. **The statewide election was certified on July 10**
   - On July 10, 2026, the California Secretary of State announced that she had certified the results of the June 2 primary and released the Statement of Vote.
   - The certification reported 9,446,461 ballots cast, including 8,423,060 vote-by-mail ballots and 1,023,401 ballots cast at voting locations.
   - July 10 was 38 days after Election Day.

4. **July 10 was the scheduled statewide certification date**
   - California's official calendar set July 2 as the deadline for county election officials to certify their results.
   - Counties were required to transmit complete primary-election returns to the Secretary of State by July 3.
   - The statewide Statement of Vote was scheduled for certification on July 10.

5. **Los Angeles County completed its local canvass earlier**
   - The Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk certified the county's final results on June 26.
   - The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors was scheduled to declare the county election officially concluded on June 30.
   - The mayoral contest was therefore locally finalized before the statewide July 10 certification.

6. **Boundary of the finding**
   - “Completed July 10” is accurate when “California's election” refers to final statewide certification of the June 2 primary.
   - It does not mean Los Angeles County continued counting its mayoral contest through July 10.
   - The June 2 contests were primary or nominating elections, not the November 2026 final elections for governor and Los Angeles mayor.
   - Certification on July 10 does not by itself establish that ordinary ballot tabulation continued every day until that date; certification follows county counting, verification, canvassing, reporting, and compilation.

#### Claim 27 determination

Official California records establish that the gubernatorial and Los Angeles mayoral primaries occurred on June 2, 2026, and that California formally certified the statewide primary on July 10, 2026.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 27 is true, supported by the evidence gathered, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://dp.electionresults.sos.ca.gov/returns/governor  
- https://clerk.lacity.gov/elections/municipal-elections  
- https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/news-releases-and-advisories/2026-news-releases-and-advisories/california-secretary-state-shirley-n-weber-phd-has-certified-results-june-2-2026-primary-election  
- https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/upcoming-elections/primary-election-june-2-2026/key-dates-and-deadlines  
- https://www.lavote.gov/home/voting-elections/current-elections/election-results/  

**Evidence note:** The original White House ZIP archives contain no dedicated California-election-timing exhibit. Claim 27 is supported by the official California state, Los Angeles city, and Los Angeles County records attached above.

### Claim 28 — It took more than a month to count the votes

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence gathered  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 28

1. **Election date**
   - California held the primary election on June 2, 2026.

2. **Completion date**
   - The California Secretary of State certified the results on July 10, 2026.

3. **Elapsed time**
   - June 2 through July 10 is 38 days.
   - Thirty-eight days is longer than one month.

#### Claim 28 determination

The official election date and certification date directly verify the statement.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 28 is true, supported by the evidence gathered, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/news-releases-and-advisories/2026-news-releases-and-advisories/california-secretary-state-shirley-n-weber-phd-has-certified-results-june-2-2026-primary-election  
- https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/upcoming-elections/primary-election-june-2-2026/key-dates-and-deadlines  

### Claim 22 — Evidence of fraud has been buried

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 22

1. **Documented fraud indicators**
   - Officials reported approximately 8,000–10,000 voter-registration applications associated with the investigated operation.
   - Identified indicators included nonexistent addresses, invalid telephone numbers, signature discrepancies, and similar handwriting across applications.
   - FBI database examinations of 107 applications found no database results for 91 applicants; of the 16 identifiable individuals, only four had signatures matching signatures on file.

2. **Canvasser and witness evidence**
   - One canvasser admitted submitting approximately 100 fabricated registration applications and alleged that supervisors demonstrated how to manufacture registrations to satisfy daily quotas.
   - Another worker admitted remaining in his vehicle and submitting applications using the names of friends or relatives.
   - Other witnesses described application-linked compensation, widespread falsification among canvassers, and fabricated applications being used to meet productivity requirements.
   - Michigan officials independently acknowledged that fraud occurred, while characterizing it as low-level employee fraud that was detected before it affected registration or voting.

3. **Restricted investigative authorization in 2021**
   - DOJ's Public Integrity Section authorized a full-field investigation into prepaid payment cards but declined to authorize a focused voter-registration-fraud investigation at that time.
   - It subsequently permitted limited preliminary contacts while requiring renewed consultation before additional investigative action.
   - The memoranda directed that no federal public statement be made about the matter.

4. **Attempted closure and the assigned agent's objection**
   - By August 2021, officials had advised that no further action should be taken in the relevant district, and the matter moved toward closure in November.
   - The assigned FBI agent wrote that the agent was “not really comfortable closing the case.”
   - The agent objected to wording that described the Public Integrity Section as merely concurring with an FBI and U.S. Attorney decision, stating that the Public Integrity Section had directed them not to pursue the matter.
   - The agent cited DOJ election-offense guidance establishing that fraudulent voter-registration submissions can constitute election fraud without proof that fraudulent votes were ultimately cast.

5. **Delayed full investigation and investigative activity**
   - A full-field investigation was not authorized until February 2023, more than two years after the original referral.
   - Approximately 100 canvasser interviews planned for November 2023 were postponed until after a scheduled Michigan election under DOJ's election-noninterference policy; the interviews were conducted in December.
   - The case agent repeatedly pursued delayed laboratory results, requested a written prosecutorial declination in March 2024, and requested a formal charging decision after the laboratory report was completed in May 2024.

6. **Non-prosecution decision and unresolved requests**
   - In July 2024, officials advised that there would be no prosecution.
   - In August 2024, the agent was advised that the case was no longer being actively investigated.
   - Repeated requests for a written declination and definitive prosecutorial position remained unresolved into September 2024, before the U.S. Attorney's Office reconsidered prosecution in October.

7. **Delayed disclosure of the internal handling record**
   - The registration irregularities were reported publicly in 2020, and portions of the state investigation became more widely available in 2023.
   - The internal FBI records documenting restricted authorization, attempted closure, the case agent's objection, delayed investigative activity, and unresolved charging requests were not released publicly until July 2026.

#### Claim 22 determination

The supplied record documents evidence of fraudulent voter-registration submissions and institutional burial through restricted authorization, attempted closure, delayed investigation, unresolved prosecutorial requests, inactive-case designation, and delayed disclosure.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 22 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/election-integrity/  
- https://www.bridgemi.com/michigan-government/muskegon-fake-voter-applications-probed-2020-referred-fbi-nessel-says/  
- https://bridgemi.com/michigan-government/fact-check-president-trump-seeks-probe-of-2020-muskegon-voter-fraud/  
- https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2013/09/30/electbook-0507.pdf  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Michigan-Voter-Registration-Investigation.zip  
SHA-256: `b73c4dee770bf6270174d3a55419498c7911ae133e0b01740bfac24ca69c40f6`

### Claim 21 — China and other countries have been trying to meddle in U.S. elections

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 21

1. **China's election-related cyber collection and targeting**
   - The supplied August 19, 2020 National Intelligence Council assessment states that Beijing expanded its cyber collection of data related to the 2020 U.S. elections.
   - It describes opportunistic intrusions against U.S. private-sector entities intended to collect information concerning political candidates, campaigns, donors, and voter data.
   - The assessment also records Chinese online-influence activity, collection of derogatory information concerning U.S. officials, and consideration of more direct measures such as leaking information or employing an online-influence network.

2. **PRC acquisition and exploitation of American voter information**
   - Other supplied intelligence records document PRC possession and analysis of large-scale American voter datasets, including information from 18 states.
   - The records describe U.S.-person identity matching, public-opinion analysis, and the creation of a dedicated exploitation capability using the acquired voter information.

3. **Public intelligence assessment and its China minority judgment**
   - The March 2021 Intelligence Community Assessment's majority judgment was that China did not deploy an operation intended to change the outcome of the 2020 presidential election.
   - The assessment nevertheless acknowledged continued Chinese intelligence collection against voters, political parties, candidates, campaign staffs, officials, and election-related subjects.
   - The National Intelligence Officer for Cyber concluded that China took steps intended to affect candidates, political processes, and voter preferences, meeting the Intelligence Community's definition of election influence.

4. **Later confirmed PRC-directed election activity**
   - The Justice Department reported that Chinese government-affiliated actors materially affected the security of networks associated with U.S. political organizations, candidates, and campaigns during the 2020 election period.
   - In February 2026, the Justice Department announced that a political operative had been sentenced after pleading guilty to acting as an illegal PRC agent. DOJ states that he executed Chinese-government taskings and helped orchestrate the election of a California city-council candidate in 2022.

5. **Russian election-influence and infrastructure operations**
   - ODNI assessed with high confidence that Russian state organizations conducted influence operations against the 2020 election.
   - A bipartisan Senate investigation separately found a coordinated Russian cyber campaign against state election infrastructure in 2016, including successful penetration of a voter-registration database.

6. **Iranian election-influence, intrusion, and intimidation operations**
   - ODNI assessed with high confidence that Iran conducted a government-authorized influence campaign targeting the 2020 election.
   - DOJ records that Iran-based actors attempted to compromise approximately 11 state voter websites, successfully downloaded information concerning more than 100,000 voters, sent voter-intimidation messages, and disseminated election disinformation.

7. **Additional foreign actors**
   - The 2021 Intelligence Community Assessment found that Cuba conducted lower-level election-influence activity.
   - It also found that Venezuela possessed the intent, although probably limited capability, to influence American public opinion surrounding the election.

#### Claim 21 determination

The supplied records document Chinese election-related cyber collection, voter-data exploitation, influence activity, and targeting of candidates and campaigns, together with election operations by Russia, Iran, and other foreign actors.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 21 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf  
- https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/seven-hackers-associated-chinese-government-charged-computer-intrusions-targeting  
- https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/political-operative-sentenced-48-months-federal-prison-acting-covert-agent-peoples-republic  
- https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2018/05/29/publications-russian-targeting-election-infrastructure-during-2016-election-summary-initial-findings/  
- https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-iranian-nationals-charged-cyber-enabled-disinformation-and-threat-campaign-designed  

**Evidence packages:**  
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Chinas-Acquisition-and-Exploitation-of-American-Voter-Data.zip  
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Vulnerabilities-in-Electronic-Voting-and-Ballot-Counting-Systems.zip  

**Evidence-package SHA-256 values:**  
- China voter data: `a823364d94ad5b9bca5dc42c10e8c4e0e782c3e6f0331e40dd600aaa27d041ce`  
- Vulnerabilities: `165d85c466cb841643f7c5219340905889ae84cc5235264c78571cae22e7a607`

### Claim 5 — The Maduro regime developed methods to alter electronic vote totals

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 5

1. **CIA Note — Summary of Select Intelligence Reporting from 2004–2020 on Venezuela's Electronic Voting Manipulation Capabilities, June 29, 2026**
   - Reports sustained Venezuelan-government interest and likely capability in manipulating electronic voting systems.
   - Reports that the Maduro regime developed detailed technical plans for the December 2020 National Assembly election.
   - Describes a method using a second set of virtual machines to replicate legitimate machine results, substitute manipulated data, overwrite digital hash files, make altered totals appear to originate from legitimate machines, and evade standard audit procedures.

2. **Earlier Venezuelan development history**
   - Reports that Venezuelan intelligence services, the National Electoral Council, and election-technology personnel developed plans before the 2012 election to deploy altered machines in approximately 300 voting centers.
   - Reports that CIA analysts considered the described manipulation capabilities technically possible and operationally feasible.

3. **Smartmatic's 2017 public disclosure**
   - Smartmatic accused the Maduro government of manipulating the announced participation figure in the 2017 Constituent Assembly election by at least one million votes.
   - Smartmatic stated that the government-announced figure diverged from information recorded by its machines and subsequently ended its Venezuelan operations.

4. **Venezuela's 2024 presidential election**
   - The Carter Center could not verify the result announced by Maduro-controlled authorities and found that the election failed international standards.
   - Machine-generated polling-place tally sheets obtained by the opposition and reviewed by independent experts conflicted with the centralized result announced by the government.

5. **Technology-provenance concern: Smartmatic, Sequoia, and Dominion**
   - Smartmatic owned Sequoia Voting Systems from 2005 to 2007, during which Sequoia products used some Smartmatic intellectual property.
   - Dominion acquired Sequoia's physical and intellectual assets in 2010 and subsequently operated as a major U.S. election-technology supplier.
   - This establishes a documented chain through which election technology, personnel, products, and transferable intellectual assets moved from a company identified in the CIA assessment as a national-security concern into a major American supplier.
   - This provenance does not, without further technical evidence, establish that Venezuelan manipulation code entered Dominion systems or affected the 2020 U.S. election.

#### Claim 5 determination

The CIA reporting describes specific technical methods developed under the Maduro regime to alter electronic vote totals, with independent corroboration from Smartmatic's 2017 disclosure and the regime's centralized handling of election totals.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 5 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.cartercenter.org/news/venezuela-073024/  
- https://apnews.com/article/41d1000926d0ab99e522e53bf6c2b916  
- https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/registered-manufacturers/sequoia-voting-systems-company-was-purchased-dominion  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Vulnerabilities-in-Electronic-Voting-and-Ballot-Counting-Systems.zip  
SHA-256: `165d85c466cb841643f7c5219340905889ae84cc5235264c78571cae22e7a607`

### Claim 4 — Adversaries could exploit those systems to disrupt elections

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 4

1. **National Intelligence Council assessments — January and August 2020**
   - State that adversaries could exploit voter-registration databases, electronic pollbooks, election websites, and electronic-results reporting systems.
   - Identify possible disruption through unavailable or altered registration information, interrupted voter check-in, disabled websites, delayed result reporting, uncertainty about reported results, intimidation, and disinformation.

2. **Documented U.S. county election-website disruption**
   - The January 2020 assessment records that cyber actors made a U.S. county election website unavailable during a mayoral primary.
   - The separately stored tabulation results were unaffected, but public access to election information was disrupted.

3. **U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence — Russian targeting**
   - Found that Russian-government-affiliated actors penetrated restricted election systems and reached positions from which voter-registration information could have been altered or deleted.

4. **U.S. Department of Justice — Iranian election-interference case**
   - Records successful exploitation of a state voter system and downloading of information concerning more than 100,000 voters.
   - Records use of voter information in threatening communications intended to intimidate voters and undermine confidence in the election.

5. **Georgia absentee-voter portal attack — 2024**
   - Attackers used approximately 420,000 IP addresses in an attempt to overwhelm Georgia's absentee-voter website.
   - The site briefly slowed, but defenses prevented shutdown; the attackers were not publicly attributed.

6. **CISA election-security resources**
   - Identify voter-information systems and election websites among assets commonly targeted by phishing, ransomware, and distributed denial-of-service attacks.

#### Claim 4 determination

The evidence establishes that adversaries can exploit the identified systems to disrupt registration verification, electronic pollbooks, voter information, election websites, and election-results reporting.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 4 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2018/05/29/publications-russian-targeting-election-infrastructure-during-2016-election-summary-initial-findings/  
- https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-iranian-nationals-charged-cyber-enabled-disinformation-and-threat-campaign-designed  
- https://apnews.com/article/4a7244637b28d5a1d755246f5c57a7a5  
- https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-toolkit-and-resources-protect-elections  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Vulnerabilities-in-Electronic-Voting-and-Ballot-Counting-Systems.zip  
SHA-256: `165d85c466cb841643f7c5219340905889ae84cc5235264c78571cae22e7a607`

### Claim 3 — Centralized voter-registration databases, electronic pollbooks, and official election websites are especially vulnerable

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 3

1. **National Intelligence Council Assessment — Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Election, August 19, 2020**
   - Specifically identifies voter-registration databases, electronic pollbooks, and state and local election websites as especially vulnerable.
   - Explains that these systems are commonly internet-connected, designed for accessibility, exposed through public-facing portals, and protected by comparatively weaker security than isolated systems.
   - Identifies unauthorized access, data theft, alteration, disruption, denial-of-service attacks, and disinformation based on real or alleged intrusions as resulting risks.

2. **U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence — Russian Targeting of Election Infrastructure During the 2016 Election**
   - Records extensive scanning of state voter-registration systems and election websites by Russian-government-affiliated actors.
   - Records successful penetration of restricted election infrastructure and voter-registration databases in a small number of states.

3. **U.S. Department of Justice — Iranian Election-Interference Case, November 18, 2021**
   - Records Iranian targeting of approximately 11 state voter-registration and voter-information websites.
   - Records successful exploitation of one state system and downloading of information concerning more than 100,000 voters.

4. **CISA Election Report — July 13, 2026**
   - Identifies election systems reachable through ordinary government networks because of weak segmentation, excessive permissions, remote-support connections, inadequate logging, and outdated configurations.

5. **U.S. Government Accountability Office — GAO-20-267**
   - Documents continuous CISA scanning of internet-accessible election systems for known vulnerabilities and remote testing of externally accessible systems.

#### Claim 3 determination

The provided evidence documents enlarged attack surfaces, actual foreign targeting, and successful penetration of centralized voter-registration databases, electronic pollbooks, and official election websites.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 3 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2018/05/29/publications-russian-targeting-election-infrastructure-during-2016-election-summary-initial-findings/  
- https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-iranian-nationals-charged-cyber-enabled-disinformation-and-threat-campaign-designed  
- https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-20-267  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Vulnerabilities-in-Electronic-Voting-and-Ballot-Counting-Systems.zip  
SHA-256: `165d85c466cb841643f7c5219340905889ae84cc5235264c78571cae22e7a607`

## Dashboard claim-review requirement

The America Watch dashboard must allow the user to select any of the 32 presidential-address statements and view its preserved record, including:

1. Statement text.
2. Truth status.
3. Evidence-support status.
4. Confidence level.
5. Evidence provided in the released packages.
6. Independent supporting or contrary sources reviewed.
7. Scope, reasoning, and supporting information.
8. Links to the preserved source package and public records.

### Claim 6 — The alterations allegedly could evade detection during an audit

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 6

1. **CIA Note — Summary of Select Intelligence Reporting from 2004–2020 on Venezuela's Electronic Voting Manipulation Capabilities, June 29, 2026**
   - Reports a plan to create a second set of virtual machines that replicated the outputs of legitimate voting machines.
   - Reports that manipulated data could be substituted while making the altered votes appear to originate from legitimate machines.
   - Describes replicating expected digital hash files, overwriting selected machine records, and preserving an internally consistent electronic record.
   - Expressly states that the reported technique was designed to operate while evading detection through standard audit procedures.

2. **National Academy of Engineering — evidence-based election analysis**
   - Explains that software bugs or malware can alter computerized election results without detection when no independent evidence exists.
   - Identifies securely preserved voter-verified paper ballots and rigorous post-election audits as the principal independent safeguard.

3. **Halderman and Teague — New South Wales iVote security research**
   - Demonstrated vulnerabilities through which an attacker could potentially manipulate votes and subvert the system's verification mechanism.
   - Establishes independent technical support for the proposition that a compromised system may also compromise electronically dependent verification.

4. **NIST election-security recommendations**
   - Warn that compromise of an election-management system can corrupt election data and transmit that corruption to connected or downstream election equipment.

#### Claim 6 determination

The supplied intelligence evidence describes a technically coherent method for altering electronic outputs and their integrity records so the alteration could evade detection during an audit.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 6 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/moving-to-evidence-based-elections  
- https://arxiv.org/abs/1504.05646  
- https://www.nist.gov/itl/voting/security-recommendations  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Vulnerabilities-in-Electronic-Voting-and-Ballot-Counting-Systems.zip  
SHA-256: `165d85c466cb841643f7c5219340905889ae84cc5235264c78571cae22e7a607`

### Claim 7 — U.S. election systems had previously been hacked or compromised

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 7

1. **National Intelligence Council Assessment — Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Election, August 19, 2020**
   - Reports that unidentified actors used ransomware in April 2020 to compromise computers belonging to a Virginia county administrator and voter registrar.
   - This records a completed compromise of election-administration systems rather than merely an attempted intrusion.

2. **CISA Election Report — July 13, 2026**
   - States that CISA conducted incident-response operations for intrusions into election systems between approximately 2019 and 2024.
   - Identifies conditions enabling adversaries to exfiltrate sensitive data, modify election artifacts, degrade system availability, and move from compromised enterprise systems toward mission-critical election components.

3. **National Intelligence Council Memorandum — Vulnerabilities in U.S. 2020 Election Infrastructure, January 15, 2020**
   - Records that cyber actors rendered a U.S. county election website unavailable during a May 2019 mayoral primary.
   - The separately stored tabulation results were unaffected, but the attack successfully disrupted an operational component of the county's election infrastructure.

4. **U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence — Russian targeting in 2016**
   - Found that Russian-government-affiliated actors targeted election infrastructure across numerous states.
   - Records successful penetration of restricted election infrastructure, including access to Illinois voter-registration systems and extraction of voter-registration information.

5. **U.S. Department of Justice — Iranian election-interference prosecution, November 18, 2021**
   - Records successful unauthorized access to a state voter-information website.
   - Records the downloading of confidential information concerning more than 100,000 voters.

#### Claim 7 determination

The supplied documents and independent government records establish multiple completed compromises of American election systems, including voter-registration systems, election websites, voter-registrar computers, and election-office networks.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 7 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2018/05/29/publications-russian-targeting-election-infrastructure-during-2016-election-summary-initial-findings/  
- https://www.justice.gov/storage/report_volume1.pdf  
- https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-iranian-nationals-charged-cyber-enabled-disinformation-and-threat-campaign-designed  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Vulnerabilities-in-Electronic-Voting-and-Ballot-Counting-Systems.zip  
SHA-256: `165d85c466cb841643f7c5219340905889ae84cc5235264c78571cae22e7a607`

### Claim 8 — Significant evidence of election fraud had been detected but was buried or covered up

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 8

1. **Original Muskegon referral and identified registration irregularities — October 2020**
   - Officials reported approximately 8,000–10,000 voter-registration applications associated with one registration operation.
   - Identified warning signs included nonexistent addresses, invalid telephone numbers, signature discrepancies, and similar handwriting across multiple applications.

2. **FBI Database Checks Spreadsheet memorandum — May 19, 2023**
   - Records database examinations of 107 voter-registration applications.
   - Ninety-one applicants produced no results in database searches.
   - Sixteen applications corresponded to identifiable individuals, but only four signatures matched signatures on file.

3. **Witness and complainant evidence**
   - FBI records contain accounts of canvassers falsifying applications, remaining in vehicles rather than canvassing, productivity-related compensation pressures, and questionable registration submissions.
   - A complainant reported declining registration but subsequently appearing as registered and receiving what she believed was an absentee ballot.

4. **Internal FBI objection to closure — November 2021**
   - The assigned agent wrote that the agent was “not really comfortable closing the case.”
   - The agent cited DOJ election-crimes guidance explaining that fraudulent voter registrations can constitute an offense without proof that fraudulent votes were ultimately cast or changed an election.
   - The agent objected to language portraying closure as an FBI/USAO decision when the record indicated direction from the Public Integrity Section not to pursue the matter.

5. **Four-year FBI case timeline**
   - October 2020: State police briefed the FBI.
   - March 2021: Investigation of prepaid cards was authorized, while a focused voter-registration-fraud investigation was initially withheld.
   - August–November 2021: Officials advised that no further action should be taken and moved toward closure.
   - February 2023: A full-field investigation was finally authorized.
   - October–December 2023: Approximately 100 canvasser interviews were postponed until after a November election.
   - March–May 2024: The case agent requested a written prosecutorial declination and a charging decision.
   - July–September 2024: Agents repeatedly requested a definitive position while no official resolution was supplied.
   - October 2024: The U.S. Attorney's Office reconsidered prosecution.
   - July 2025: Material witness interviews were still occurring nearly five years after the original referral.

6. **Delayed disclosure of the internal handling record**
   - Some allegations were publicly reported in 2020 and discussed more extensively in 2023.
   - The internal record showing attempted closure, the assigned agent's objection, restricted authorization, repeated delays, and unresolved prosecutorial requests was not publicly released until 2026.

#### Claim 8 determination

The evidence establishes significant detected voter-registration fraud indicators and a multiyear pattern of restricted authorization, attempted closure, postponed investigative activity, unresolved prosecutorial decisions, and delayed disclosure that institutionally buried the matter.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 8 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

#### Correction preserved

The initial review incorrectly treated the statement as requiring proof of an intentional political conspiracy before either “buried” or “covered up” could be supported. That standard was too restrictive and failed to evaluate the cumulative institutional conduct. The corrected review distinguishes the established institutional burial from the still-open question of each participant's motive and partisan attribution.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://bridgemi.com/michigan-government/muskegon-fake-voter-applications-probed-2020-referred-fbi-nessel-says/  
- https://www.wemu.org/michigan-news/2026-07-17/trump-uses-debunked-muskegon-case-as-part-of-election-fraud-claims  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Michigan-Voter-Registration-Investigation.zip  
SHA-256: `b73c4dee770bf6270174d3a55419498c7911ae133e0b01740bfac24ca69c40f6`

### Claim 9 — FBI files documented evidence of alleged fraud by a large-scale voter-registration operation in Michigan

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 9

1. **FBI provenance and investigative record**
   - The released package contains FBI electronic communications, FD-302 witness-interview reports, database-search results, internal correspondence, investigative timelines, laboratory work, and prosecutorial communications from an FBI Detroit election-crimes investigation.

2. **Muskegon clerk and original law-enforcement referral — October 2020**
   - The clerk identified nonexistent addresses, invalid telephone numbers, mismatched signatures, and repeated handwriting across voter-registration applications.
   - The original FBI referral reports approximately 8,000–10,000 applications associated with the operation in Muskegon, including a delivery of approximately 2,500 applications on one occasion.

3. **FBI database examination — May 19, 2023**
   - Of 107 reviewed applications, 91 applicants produced no results in database searches.
   - Sixteen applications corresponded to identifiable individuals, but only four signatures matched signatures already on file.

4. **Canvasser admissions and witness allegations**
   - One canvasser reportedly admitted completing approximately 100 fabricated voter-registration applications.
   - The witness identified 22 reviewed applications she had completed and reportedly acknowledged signing 20 using fabricated identities.
   - Another worker reportedly acknowledged that he probably forged signatures during his employment.
   - Additional witnesses described productivity requirements, payment incentives, and awareness that other workers submitted falsified applications.

5. **Evidence potentially reaching operational management**
   - A witness alleged that supervisory personnel told a meeting of more than 100 workers to fill in applications if they could not obtain enough legitimate registrations.
   - The witness alleged that employees were told to invent names and identifying information to meet quotas.
   - The witness further alleged that office personnel assisted in completing fabricated applications and that management knew the conduct was occurring.

6. **Large-scale organizational indicators**
   - Records identify activity in Muskegon, Detroit, Ypsilanti, Southfield, Flint, and Lansing.
   - The operation included multiple offices, more than 100 workers at one reported meeting, supervisors, canvassers, administrative employees, payroll cards, transportation, and centralized processing.

#### Claim 9 determination

The FBI files contain documentary, database, and testimonial evidence of alleged voter-registration fraud by an operation whose volume, geographic reach, staffing, and organizational structure were large-scale.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 9 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://bridgemi.com/michigan-government/muskegon-fake-voter-applications-probed-2020-referred-fbi-nessel-says/  
- https://www.fox17online.com/news/local-news/lakeshore/muskegon/documents-detail-msp-investigation-into-alleged-muskegon-area-voter-fraud  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Michigan-Voter-Registration-Investigation.zip  
SHA-256: `b73c4dee770bf6270174d3a55419498c7911ae133e0b01740bfac24ca69c40f6`

### Claim 10 — In 2020, Michigan State Police raided a Democratic get-out-the-vote organization in Muskegon

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 10

1. **Michigan State Police investigation and search warrants**
   - Michigan State Police joined the Muskegon Police Department investigation on October 22, 2020.
   - MSP obtained surveillance authority and planned search warrants for October 29, 2020.
   - A subsequent DOJ/FBI communication confirms that MSP executed a search warrant at a location associated with the voter-registration operation.
   - FBI agents present during the search observed boxes containing reloadable payment cards reportedly used to compensate registration workers.
   - A later witness told the FBI that employees were dismissed after police executed the search warrant at the office.

2. **Connection to the Muskegon operation**
   - The investigation centered on approximately 8,000–10,000 applications submitted to the Muskegon City Clerk.
   - More than 100 canvassers reportedly conducted voter-registration work in the Muskegon area.
   - The searched locations were associated with the organization conducting the Muskegon registration operation.

3. **Voter-registration and turnout-related work**
   - Canvassers were employed to locate unregistered voters, collect voter-registration applications, and reportedly help individuals obtain ballots.
   - Records identify door-to-door and public-location canvassing, registration activity, ballot-related assistance, paid field operations, and centralized processing across several Michigan cities.

4. **Democratic political alignment**
   - Campaign-finance records and investigative reporting connect GBI Strategies to paid work for Democratic candidates and political committees, including field consulting and canvassing expenditures.
   - The evidence supports describing the private contractor as Democratic-aligned.
   - The available evidence does not establish that the organization was owned or formally operated by the Democratic National Committee or that Democratic candidates directed the alleged fraudulent conduct.

#### Claim 10 determination

Michigan State Police executed search warrants against a Democratic-aligned voter-registration and get-out-the-vote operation whose Muskegon activities were under investigation.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 10 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://bridgemi.com/michigan-government/muskegon-fake-voter-applications-probed-2020-referred-fbi-nessel-says/  
- https://www.fox17online.com/news/local-news/lakeshore/muskegon/documents-detail-msp-investigation-into-alleged-muskegon-area-voter-fraud  
- https://www.newsweek.com/fact-check-did-michigan-police-uncover-2020-democratic-election-plot-1820154  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Michigan-Voter-Registration-Investigation.zip  
SHA-256: `b73c4dee770bf6270174d3a55419498c7911ae133e0b01740bfac24ca69c40f6`

### Claim 11 — Michigan authorities were sufficiently concerned by what they found that they contacted and briefed the FBI's Detroit election team

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 11

1. **Initial detection and local investigation**
   - October 5, 2020: The Muskegon City Clerk began receiving packages containing suspicious voter-registration applications.
   - October 16: Muskegon Police opened a voter-registration-fraud investigation.
   - October 20: A box containing approximately 2,500 additional applications was delivered, and the clerk contacted Muskegon Police.

2. **Escalation to Michigan State Police**
   - October 22: Michigan State Police joined the investigation.
   - October 23: MSP obtained a GPS warrant connected with the investigation.
   - October 26: An internal communication recorded MSP's intention to brief the FBI Detroit Election Team the following day.

3. **Direct FBI briefing — October 27, 2020**
   - The original FBI electronic communication expressly states that MSP briefed the Detroit Election Team regarding the allegations.
   - The separate four-year FBI case timeline begins with: “10/27/2020 — MSP briefed FBI DE Election Team.”
   - The record states that MSP wanted assistance and was generally willing to conduct a joint investigation with the FBI, subject to coordination between state and federal prosecutors.

4. **Federal and multiagency escalation**
   - FBI Detroit notified the U.S. Attorneys' Offices for both the Eastern and Western Districts of Michigan.
   - The investigation involved the Muskegon Police Department, Michigan State Police, Michigan Attorney General's Office, FBI Detroit, and federal prosecutors.
   - MSP subsequently executed search warrants, with FBI agents present at one searched location.

#### Claim 11 determination

Two FBI records expressly document Michigan authorities contacting and briefing the FBI's Detroit election team, and their investigative actions demonstrate the seriousness of their concern.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 11 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://bridgemi.com/michigan-government/muskegon-fake-voter-applications-probed-2020-referred-fbi-nessel-says/  
- https://www.fox17online.com/news/local-news/lakeshore/muskegon/documents-detail-msp-investigation-into-alleged-muskegon-area-voter-fraud  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Michigan-Voter-Registration-Investigation.zip  
SHA-256: `b73c4dee770bf6270174d3a55419498c7911ae133e0b01740bfac24ca69c40f6`

### Claim 12 — Some canvassers admitted signing voter-registration forms in other people's names, submitting registrations for nonexistent people, and receiving application-linked payment cards

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 12

1. **Admissions concerning forged signatures**
   - An FBI FD-302 records a canvasser's admissions concerning 22 applications presented during an interview.
   - The witness reportedly acknowledged completing identifying-information sections and signing 20 applications using names or identities not legitimately supplied by actual registrants.
   - The witness described workers taking unsigned or rejected forms, signing them, and submitting them for production credit.
   - A separate worker told the FBI that he could not remember each instance but acknowledged that he probably forged signatures during his employment.

2. **Admissions concerning fabricated registrants**
   - A witness reportedly stated that supervisors instructed workers to fill in forms when they could not obtain enough legitimate applications.
   - The witness said she was told to invent names and identifying information and completed blank applications using made-up people to satisfy daily quotas.
   - She estimated personally submitting approximately 100 fraudulent applications and believed the practice extended to numerous other workers.

3. **Independent database corroboration**
   - FBI database checks found no identifiable person for 91 of 107 reviewed applications.
   - This result does not independently prove that every one of the 91 was fabricated, but it materially corroborates the admission that fabricated identities were used.

4. **Application-linked payment cards**
   - One witness said compensation was based on the number of registrations or signatures produced and that she received payment through a reloadable card.
   - Another witness described weekly compensation loaded onto a company-issued debit card.
   - Witnesses described daily application quotas and production-dependent compensation.
   - During the search, authorities observed boxes of “blue cards” or reloadable debit cards; subsequent interviews indicated that the cards were used to pay workers bringing in applications.
   - DOJ authorized a full-field investigation concerning the prepaid cards in March 2021.

5. **Contrary and limiting witness evidence**
   - Not every interviewed canvasser admitted wrongdoing.
   - At least one witness denied fabricating information or submitting fake signatures and said she had only heard that other workers submitted falsified forms.

#### Claim 12 determination

The FBI records document canvasser admissions to signing other people's names, fabricating nonexistent registrants, and receiving application-linked compensation through payment cards.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 12 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://bridgemi.com/michigan-government/muskegon-fake-voter-applications-probed-2020-referred-fbi-nessel-says/  
- https://www.fox17online.com/news/local-news/lakeshore/muskegon/documents-detail-msp-investigation-into-alleged-muskegon-area-voter-fraud  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Michigan-Voter-Registration-Investigation.zip  
SHA-256: `b73c4dee770bf6270174d3a55419498c7911ae133e0b01740bfac24ca69c40f6`

### Claim 13 — The FBI agents working on the Michigan case believed that crimes had been committed

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 13

1. **Direct internal objection from a case agent — November 2021**
   - The agent wrote: “I'm not really comfortable closing the case at this point…”
   - The agent objected to language portraying non-pursuit as an FBI decision when the record indicated that DOJ's Public Integrity Section directed the matter not be pursued.

2. **Application of DOJ election-crimes guidance**
   - The agent compared the discovered conduct with DOJ's *Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses* manual.
   - The cited provisions identify submitting fictitious registrants, providing false names or addresses, and producing registrations known to be materially defective as potential federal crimes.
   - After applying that guidance, the agent stated that the canvassers “still submitted fraudulent voter registration applications.”
   - The agent acknowledged that proving willfulness could be difficult, distinguishing proof and charging concerns from whether fraudulent conduct had occurred.

3. **Investigative-team conduct consistent with suspected criminal activity**
   - Agents continued collecting and reviewing questionable applications and performing database checks.
   - The investigation was eventually expanded into a full-field investigation.
   - FBI headquarters approved funding for approximately 20 agents to conduct canvasser interviews.
   - Agents conducted mass interviews, and the FBI laboratory performed handwriting and indented-writing examinations.
   - The case agent repeatedly sought prosecutorial guidance, requested a written declination, and requested a formal charging decision after the laboratory report was completed.
   - The U.S. Attorney's Office later reconsidered prosecution.

#### Claim 13 determination

The principal case agent characterized the applications as fraudulent, invoked federal criminal statutes, resisted closure, and sought a charging decision, while the investigative team pursued interviews, forensic examinations, and prosecution requests.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 13 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public record:**  
- https://bridgemi.com/michigan-government/muskegon-fake-voter-applications-probed-2020-referred-fbi-nessel-says/  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Michigan-Voter-Registration-Investigation.zip  
SHA-256: `b73c4dee770bf6270174d3a55419498c7911ae133e0b01740bfac24ca69c40f6`

### Claim 14 — The Biden Department of Justice slow-walked the Michigan investigation and ultimately killed it

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 14

1. **Restricted authorization during 2021**
   - February 2021: The FBI sought authorization to open the investigation.
   - March 2021: DOJ's Public Integrity Section authorized investigation of the prepaid payment cards but withheld authorization for a focused voter-registration-fraud investigation.
   - April 2021: DOJ permitted limited preliminary contacts and required renewed consultation before additional investigative action.
   - August 2021: Officials were advised that no further action should be taken in the Western District.

2. **Attempted closure and FBI-agent objection — November 2021**
   - DOJ moved toward closing the matter.
   - The assigned FBI agent wrote that the agent was not comfortable closing the case.
   - The agent objected to language portraying non-pursuit as an FBI decision rather than direction from DOJ's Public Integrity Section.
   - The agent cited federal election-crimes guidance showing that fraudulent registrations can be prosecutable without proof that fraudulent votes affected an election.

3. **Multiyear delay before full investigation**
   - March–August 2022: Agents were permitted to review limited application batches and conduct database checks.
   - November 2022: The case agent again requested DOJ guidance.
   - February 2023: A complete full-field investigation was finally authorized, more than two years after the original referral.
   - October 2023: Approximately 100 planned interviews were postponed until after a November election.
   - December 2023: The mass interviews occurred.

4. **Non-prosecution and functional termination during 2024**
   - March 2024: A federal prosecutor told the agent that prosecution was not expected; the agent requested a written declination.
   - May 2024: After completion of the FBI laboratory report, the agent requested a formal charging decision.
   - The case timeline records that officials were advised there would be no prosecution.
   - July 2024: The agent continued requesting the promised written declination.
   - August 1, 2024: The agent was informed that the case was no longer actively being investigated.
   - Further requests through September did not produce a definitive written prosecutorial resolution.

5. **Institutional attribution**
   - The relevant authorization restrictions, closure direction, prosecutorial delays, non-prosecution decision, and inactive-case status came from DOJ's Public Integrity Section and federal prosecutors between 2021 and 2024, during the Biden administration.
   - The statement attributes the conduct institutionally to the Biden Department of Justice; it does not require proof of President Biden's personal participation or the private motive of every official.

#### Claim 14 determination

The cumulative chronology establishes that the Biden Department of Justice slow-walked the investigation through repeated restrictions, attempted closure, delayed authorization, postponed interviews, unresolved prosecutorial requests, a non-prosecution decision, and inactive-case designation.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 14 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

#### Correction preserved

The initial review noted that the termination was reversible. That observation was logically irrelevant to whether the Biden DOJ originally killed the investigation and has been removed as a qualification on the finding.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://bridgemi.com/michigan-government/muskegon-fake-voter-applications-probed-2020-referred-fbi-nessel-says/  
- https://www.wemu.org/michigan-news/2026-07-17/trump-uses-debunked-muskegon-case-as-part-of-election-fraud-claims  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Michigan-Voter-Registration-Investigation.zip  
SHA-256: `b73c4dee770bf6270174d3a55419498c7911ae133e0b01740bfac24ca69c40f6`

### Claim 15 — A Department of Homeland Security review identified approximately 278,000 noncitizens registered to vote in federal elections

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 15

1. **More than 250,000 registrations identified in four states**
   - A DHS summary dated June 22, 2026 states that public voter files showed more than 250,000 noncitizens registered to vote in California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Nevada.
   - The summary states that these four states had not used the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements program, known as SAVE, to check their voter files.

2. **More than 28,000 additional registrations identified through SAVE**
   - The same summary states that 25 states processed more than 68 million voter-registration records through SAVE.
   - It reports that this process identified more than 28,000 noncitizens registered to vote.
   - It separately reports more than 400,000 deceased registrants; that figure is not part of the noncitizen total.

3. **Basis for the approximately 278,000 figure**
   - The two reported noncitizen groups exceed 250,000 and 28,000 respectively.
   - Their combined minimum is therefore more than 278,000, making “approximately 278,000” a conservative summary of the DHS-reported findings.

4. **SAVE context**
   - USCIS describes SAVE as a service through which authorized agencies verify immigration status and U.S. citizenship using federal records.
   - The evidence therefore supports the statement as a report of what DHS identified through public voter-file analysis and SAVE processing.

#### Claim 15 determination

The DHS document reports more than 250,000 identified noncitizen registrations in four states and more than 28,000 additional registrations identified through SAVE processing, directly supporting the approximately 278,000 figure.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 15 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.uscis.gov/save  
- https://www.uscis.gov/save/about-save/about-save  
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/election-integrity/  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Noncitizens-on-State-Voter-Rolls.zip  
SHA-256: `3291004b5f1631fba0f306a78027858b94d8ced1f740663c2fb6eccd7b34158e`

### Claim 16 — Since Democratic-led states refused to share their voter files, the actual number of noncitizens registered to vote is much higher

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 16

1. **Documented refusals to provide requested voter information**
   - The Department of Justice filed federal lawsuits against multiple Democratic-led states for failing to produce the statewide voter-registration information DOJ requested.
   - The September 25, 2025 cases included California, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, and Pennsylvania.
   - Later cases included Delaware, Maryland, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Nevada, and New Jersey.
   - The litigation itself establishes that multiple Democratic-led states denied the federal government access to requested voter information.

2. **Incomplete national review**
   - The DHS evidence summary states that more than 250,000 noncitizen registrations were identified from the first set of public voter files reviewed in four states that had not used SAVE.
   - It separately states that 25 states processed more than 68 million registration records through SAVE, but only ten had processed their complete voter lists; some other states processed only portions of their rolls.
   - DHS stated that its investigation was expanding to additional states.

3. **The reported figure is a minimum, not a national ceiling**
   - The Election Assistance Commission reported more than 211 million active registered voters nationally for the 2024 general election.
   - The DHS review therefore did not represent a complete review of the national voter-registration universe.
   - If the DHS-identified matches are valid, additional review of unexamined records and voter information withheld from the requested federal analysis will identify additional noncitizen registrations.
   - The evidence supports the statement's conclusion that the actual national number is materially higher than the approximately 278,000 identified in the limited analysis.

#### Claim 16 determination

Multiple Democratic-led states refused to provide the complete voter information requested for the federal review, leaving the DHS analysis incomplete and supporting the conclusion that the actual number of noncitizen registrations is much higher.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 16 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

#### Correction preserved

The initial review imposed an unnecessary qualification based on whether some states supplied public or redacted versions of their files. That standard was not part of the statement and has been removed. The relevant question is whether Democratic-led states denied access to requested voter information; the documentary record establishes that they did.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-six-states-failure-provide-voter-registration-rolls  
- https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-six-additional-states-failure-provide-voter-registration-rolls  
- https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-four-additional-states-and-one-locality-failure-comply-federal  
- https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/26a0180p-06.pdf  
- https://www.eac.gov/news/2025/06/30/us-election-assistance-commission-releases-2024-election-administration-and-voting  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Noncitizens-on-State-Voter-Rolls.zip  
SHA-256: `3291004b5f1631fba0f306a78027858b94d8ced1f740663c2fb6eccd7b34158e`

### Claim 17 — Even the limited DHS analysis found more than a quarter of a million noncitizens illegally registered to vote

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 17

1. **More than 250,000 identified in the first four reviewed states**
   - The DHS summary states that review of the first set of public voter files identified more than 250,000 noncitizens illegally registered to vote in California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Nevada.
   - More than 250,000 is, by itself, more than one-quarter of a million.

2. **More than 28,000 additional registrations identified through SAVE**
   - The same DHS summary states that 25 states processed more than 68 million registration records through SAVE.
   - DHS reports that those states identified more than 28,000 noncitizens illegally registered to vote.
   - Combined with the four-state finding, the reported total exceeds 278,000.

3. **The analysis was expressly limited**
   - The public-file finding covered the first four states reviewed.
   - Only ten participating states had processed their complete voter lists through SAVE.
   - Other participating states had processed portions of their rolls, and DHS stated that the investigation was expanding to additional states.

4. **Registration conduct and federal law**
   - “Foreigners” in the statement corresponds to the DHS document's term “noncitizens.”
   - Federal election-offense guidance identifies knowingly fraudulent registration by an ineligible noncitizen and knowingly making a false claim of U.S. citizenship to register as federal offenses, including under 18 U.S.C. § 1015(f) and 52 U.S.C. § 20511.

#### Claim 17 determination

The DHS evidence reports more than 250,000 noncitizen registrations in the first four reviewed states and more than 28,000 additional registrations identified through SAVE processing, clearly exceeding one-quarter of a million.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 17 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.dhs.gov/twitter  
- https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2013/09/30/electbook-0507.pdf  
- https://www.justice.gov/olc/media/1440346/dl  
- https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=%28title%3A52+section%3A20511+edition%3Aprelim%29  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Noncitizens-on-State-Voter-Rolls.zip  
SHA-256: `3291004b5f1631fba0f306a78027858b94d8ced1f740663c2fb6eccd7b34158e`

### Claim 18 — Taken together, the disclosures reveal an election system so broken and vulnerable that it is not defensible

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the cumulative evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 18

1. **Known and persistent election-software vulnerabilities**
   - CISA reports that structural constraints in election-system certification can prevent timely patching.
   - Known and documented vulnerabilities can remain in production election systems for months or years.
   - Inconsistent vendor disclosure limits election officials' ability to evaluate risks and apply compensating controls.

2. **Weak election-office network security**
   - CISA repeatedly found flat or inadequately segmented networks, weak identity and access management, shared credentials, inadequate multifactor authentication, insufficient logging, outdated operating systems, and exposed remote-access pathways.
   - In multiple assessments, CISA personnel gained full network control within hours or days, demonstrating that election-office environments could be penetrated by moderately skilled adversaries.

3. **Exploitable voting and ballot-marking technology**
   - The technical evidence documents exploitable vulnerabilities in voting, ballot-marking, election-management, and tabulation-related systems.
   - Some documented methods could manipulate electronic election data and compromise verification mechanisms that depend on information generated inside the same electronic environment.

4. **Repeated attacks and successful compromises of voter-registration infrastructure**
   - The supplied voter-registration database report states that hackers attempted to breach voter-registration systems in all 50 states.
   - It reports confirmed successful compromises in at least 20 states.
   - The released intelligence and law-enforcement records document foreign acquisition and exploitation of American voter information.

5. **Registration-integrity failures**
   - The Michigan records document large-scale fraudulent-registration indicators and a multiyear pattern of restricted authorization, attempted closure, postponed investigative activity, and eventual termination.
   - DHS reports more than 278,000 noncitizen registrations from an expressly incomplete review of selected and partially processed state voter files.

6. **Cumulative system failure**
   - The disclosed problems independently affect software, networks, election vendors, voter databases, voting equipment, registration controls, foreign-data exposure, investigative response, and institutional oversight.
   - Because the failures cross multiple independent components and controls, they support a systemic conclusion rather than an isolated-equipment or single-jurisdiction concern.

#### Claim 18 determination

The cumulative evidence documents persistent vulnerabilities and failures across the technical, administrative, registration, investigative, and oversight layers of the election system, supporting the statement that the system is broken and indefensible.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 18 is true, supported by the cumulative evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/election-integrity/  
- https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/election-security  
- https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2013/09/30/electbook-0507.pdf  

**Evidence packages:**  
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Vulnerabilities-in-Electronic-Voting-and-Ballot-Counting-Systems.zip  
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Chinas-Acquisition-and-Exploitation-of-American-Voter-Data.zip  
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Michigan-Voter-Registration-Investigation.zip  
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Noncitizens-on-State-Voter-Rolls.zip  

**Evidence-package SHA-256 values:**  
- Vulnerabilities: `165d85c466cb841643f7c5219340905889ae84cc5235264c78571cae22e7a607`  
- China voter data: `a823364d94ad5b9bca5dc42c10e8c4e0e782c3e6f0331e40dd600aaa27d041ce`  
- Michigan investigation: `b73c4dee770bf6270174d3a55419498c7911ae133e0b01740bfac24ca69c40f6`  
- Noncitizen voter rolls: `3291004b5f1631fba0f306a78027858b94d8ced1f740663c2fb6eccd7b34158e`

### Claim 19 — Hundreds of millions of U.S. voter files are in the hands of foreign governments

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 19

1. **PRC possession of more than 200 million U.S. voter records**
   - A declassified intelligence document reports that a PRC entity possessed a collection of likely leaked or compromised data containing U.S. voter information.
   - Its table identifies one dataset containing 204,822,241 U.S. voter records, or approximately 45 gigabytes.
   - The apparent contents included voter names, ages, telephone numbers, addresses, and related information.
   - That single documented dataset independently satisfies the statement's “hundreds of millions” quantity.

2. **Additional state voter datasets**
   - The same intelligence document identifies additional state voter databases containing approximately 1.7 million, 7.9 million, and 5.6 million records.
   - It identifies several more state voter databases whose record volumes are unknown or redacted.
   - The disclosed numerical datasets collectively account for approximately 220 million records, subject to possible overlap among datasets.

3. **PRC analysis of voter information from 18 states**
   - A separate declassified intelligence report documents PRC possession and analysis of voter-registration information from 18 states.
   - The data included names, birth dates, home and mailing addresses, political-party affiliations, voting histories, military affiliations, and other personally identifiable information.
   - The report describes plans for U.S.-person identity matching and public-opinion analysis using the acquired voter data.

4. **Russian government acquisition of U.S. voter files**
   - The supplied government report states that Russian government cyber actors accessed voter-registration files from U.S. county systems.
   - It separately reports that Russian actors hacked a state board-of-elections website and stole information concerning approximately 500,000 voters.

5. **Iranian government acquisition of U.S. voter data**
   - CISA and the FBI reported that Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps actors attempted to obtain voter-registration data from multiple state websites.
   - The agencies confirmed that the Iranian actors successfully obtained voter-registration data from at least one state.

#### Claim 19 determination

A PRC-held dataset contained more than 204 million U.S. voter records, additional records document PRC possession and analysis of voter information from 18 states, and Russian and Iranian state actors separately acquired U.S. voter-registration information.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 19 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/election-integrity/  
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa20-296b  
- https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/with-midterms-deck-trump-deliver-primetime-speech-election-security-2026-07-16/  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Chinas-Acquisition-and-Exploitation-of-American-Voter-Data.zip  
SHA-256: `a823364d94ad5b9bca5dc42c10e8c4e0e782c3e6f0331e40dd600aaa27d041ce`

### Claim 20 — U.S. voting machines and ballot-counting systems are exposed to hacking and manipulation

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 20

1. **National Intelligence Council assessment**
   - The August 19, 2020 assessment states that hostile actors could manipulate systems that count or tabulate votes, including voting machines, on a localized basis.
   - This is a direct intelligence-community assessment of exposure to manipulation.

2. **CISA network-access findings**
   - CISA found election-management systems, tabulation systems, and central scanning infrastructure reachable through weak network segmentation, shared authentication domains, overly broad firewall rules, remote-support tunnels, unmonitored management tools, and indirect network paths.
   - The report states that these conditions create exploitable pathways from ordinary phishing-based access to high-value election assets.
   - In multiple assessments, CISA personnel obtained full network control within hours or days.

3. **Confirmed voting-machine vulnerabilities**
   - CISA's ImageCast X advisory documented vulnerabilities permitting malicious-code installation, malware propagation through removable media or election-definition files, elevated-privilege code execution, authentication forgery, and concealment of malicious applications.
   - One documented weakness could allow forged voter authentication to produce unauthorized ballots.

4. **Demonstrated ballot-manipulation pathways**
   - Technical testing presented in *Curling v. Raffensperger* demonstrated pathways to alter ballot QR codes, change or delete selected votes, install malware, manipulate audit logs, and spread malicious software through election-management files.
   - An attacker could encode altered selections in a machine-readable barcode while leaving the human-readable text unchanged; the scanner would tabulate the barcode.
   - The federal court recorded that CISA independently confirmed many of the identified vulnerabilities.

5. **Exposure is established independently of completed exploitation**
   - CISA reported no evidence that the particular ImageCast X vulnerabilities had been exploited in an actual election at the time of its advisory.
   - That observation concerns detected exploitation, while Claim 20 concerns whether the systems are exposed to hacking and manipulation.
   - CISA's confirmation of the vulnerabilities directly establishes that exposure.

#### Claim 20 determination

The supplied evidence documents vulnerabilities and practical attack paths involving ballot-marking devices, scanners, voting machines, election-management systems, tabulation systems, and supporting networks, directly establishing exposure to hacking and manipulation.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 20 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-22-154-01  
- https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/georgia/gandce/1%3A2017cv02989/240678/1705/  
- https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/georgia/gandce/1%3A2017cv02989/240678/1868/  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Vulnerabilities-in-Electronic-Voting-and-Ballot-Counting-Systems.zip  
SHA-256: `165d85c466cb841643f7c5219340905889ae84cc5235264c78571cae22e7a607`

### Claim 2 — Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and nonstate groups can compromise U.S. election infrastructure

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 2

1. **National Intelligence Council Assessment — Foreign Threats to the 2020 U.S. Election, August 19, 2020**
   - Assesses that Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and nonstate groups possess the capability to compromise U.S. election infrastructure.
   - Identifies voter-registration databases, electronic pollbooks, election websites, vote-counting and tabulation systems, and election-reporting systems as potential targets.
   - States that hostile actors could exploit internet-connected election infrastructure and manipulate vote-counting or tabulation systems on a localized basis.

2. **CISA Election Report — July 13, 2026**
   - Documents vulnerabilities and exploitable pathways in election software and election-office networks.
   - Identifies pathways by which adversaries can move from ordinary phishing or enterprise-network access to high-value election assets.

3. **U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence — Russian Targeting of Election Infrastructure During the 2016 Election**
   - Found that Russian-government-affiliated actors targeted election systems in at least 18 states, with three additional states possibly targeted.
   - Found successful penetration of voter-registration databases in a small number of states.
   - Found that Russian actors reached positions from which registration data could have been altered or deleted.

4. **U.S. Department of Justice — Iranian Election-Interference Case, November 18, 2021**
   - States that Iran-based actors attempted to compromise approximately 11 state voter websites.
   - Records successful exploitation of a misconfigured state system and unauthorized downloading of information concerning more than 100,000 voters.
   - Records subsequent use of voter information in an intimidation and disinformation campaign.

5. **Chinese state-affiliated voter-data compromise — United Kingdom Electoral Commission**
   - The British government attributed the theft of voter-registration data covering approximately 40 million people to Chinese state-affiliated hackers.
   - The incident independently demonstrates the capability to penetrate a national voter-information system.

6. **North Korean and nonstate capability evidence**
   - The National Intelligence Council expressly includes North Korea and nonstate groups among actors capable of compromising U.S. election infrastructure.
   - CISA identifies election networks and voter-information systems as targets of phishing, ransomware, denial-of-service attacks, and criminal intrusion.

#### Claim 2 determination

The supplied intelligence assessment, documented Russian and Iranian penetrations, a Chinese-attributed compromise of a national voter-information system, CISA's technical findings, and assessed North Korean and nonstate capabilities directly support the statement.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 2 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2018/05/29/publications-russian-targeting-election-infrastructure-during-2016-election-summary-initial-findings/  
- https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-iranian-nationals-charged-cyber-enabled-disinformation-and-threat-campaign-designed  
- https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/britain-summons-chinese-charge-daffaires-over-cyber-row-2024-03-26/  

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Vulnerabilities-in-Electronic-Voting-and-Ballot-Counting-Systems.zip  
SHA-256: `165d85c466cb841643f7c5219340905889ae84cc5235264c78571cae22e7a607`

### Claim 29 — This is worse than any Third World country

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence gathered  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 29

1. **The comparison concerns California's routine 38-day statewide certification period**
   - California held its primary election on June 2, 2026.
   - The California Secretary of State certified the Statement of Vote on July 10, 2026, 38 days after Election Day.
   - The 38-day period was the state's scheduled certification process, rather than a delay caused by an armed conflict, a nationwide fraud adjudication, or a disputed transfer of power.

2. **Credible elections in developing countries routinely produce or complete results substantially faster**
   - In India's 2024 national election, the final phase of voting occurred on June 1, counting occurred on June 4, and the election was scheduled to be completed by June 6.
   - South Africa held its 2024 national election on May 29 and officially announced the national results on June 2.
   - These official timelines directly support the comparison that California's routine 38-day process was substantially slower than credible national election processes in major developing democracies.

3. **Fraudulent or politically unresolved contests are not valid measures of a legitimate election norm**
   - Afghanistan's 2009, 2014, and 2019 presidential contests involved mass fraud allegations, large-scale audits or invalidations, extensive disputed-vote proceedings, political deadlock, or competing claims to governmental authority.
   - The 2019 contest involved approximately 300,000 disputed votes out of 1.8 million cast, approximately 16,500 complaints, two audits, and competing inauguration ceremonies.
   - Those events document electoral breakdown and political crisis; they do not establish a credible, ordinary election-counting standard comparable to California's routine statutory schedule.

#### Claim 29 determination

The official California timeline and international election records establish that California's routine 38-day statewide certification period was worse than the substantially faster result timelines documented in credible elections across major developing countries.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 29 is true, supported by the evidence gathered, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/upcoming-elections/primary-election-june-2-2026/key-dates-and-deadlines  
- https://elections24.eci.gov.in/election-details-odisa  
- https://www.thepresidency.gov.za/president-proclaims-election-date-and-public-holiday  
- https://english.news.cn/20240603/717514713a5345daa048bd474edb3832/c.html  
- https://unama.unmissions.org/election-%E2%80%98completed-credibility%E2%80%99-will-be-milestone-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-history-%E2%80%93-un-envoy  
- https://2021-2025.state.gov/report/custom/b8b7bed80b/

### Claim 30 — There's no Third World country that has elections like we have

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence gathered  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 30

1. **The American model is unusually decentralized and internally inconsistent**
   - The U.S. Election Assistance Commission describes American election administration as highly decentralized, with each state operating under its own election laws and procedures.
   - Fourteen states and Washington, D.C., permit in-person voting without presentation of an identification document.
   - The federal voter-registration form cannot presently require documentary proof of citizenship.

2. **The United States makes unusually extensive use of unrestricted mail voting**
   - Eight states and Washington, D.C., automatically mail ballots to all active voters.
   - Twenty-nine additional states offer no-excuse absentee or mail voting.
   - Approximately 30 percent of all ballots cast in the 2024 federal election were cast by mail.

3. **Unrestricted domestic postal voting is not the developing-country norm**
   - International IDEA's comparative database covers 204 countries and identifies postal voting as the least-used special voting arrangement among non-OECD countries.
   - The database identifies only one non-OECD country allowing unrestricted domestic postal voting: Liechtenstein, a wealthy European microstate rather than a developing country.
   - In-country postal voting is rare in Africa and Latin America and, where available in developing countries, is ordinarily limited to specified classes of voters.

4. **Major developing democracies use materially different identity, registration, and counting systems**
   - India requires a voter to be listed on the electoral roll and present an approved photo identification document. Its 2024 count began three days after the final voting phase.
   - South Africa requires a South African identity document both to register and to vote. Its 2024 national results were announced four days after Election Day.
   - Mexico requires an original birth certificate, photo identification, and recent proof of address to obtain its voting credential. Its preliminary presidential results were available on election night, with approximately 95 percent of polling-place records published by the following day.
   - Brazil requires official photo identification at the polls. Its 2022 presidential winner was established approximately three hours after voting ended.

5. **No credible developing-country comparator reproduced the combined American model**
   - The reviewed developing democracies did not combine non-documentary voting in multiple jurisdictions, federal registration without documentary citizenship proof, widespread unrestricted mail voting, highly decentralized election administration, and routine month-plus statewide certification.
   - Fraudulent, politically unresolved, or negotiated contests were excluded because they document electoral breakdown rather than a legitimate election-administration norm.

#### Claim 30 determination

The evidence establishes that the United States combines decentralized administration, non-documentary voting, registration without documentary citizenship proof, extensive unrestricted mail voting, electronic infrastructure, and prolonged certification in a way not found among the developing democracies examined.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 30 is true, supported by the evidence gathered, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.eac.gov/voters/voter-faqs  
- https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/voter-verification-without-id-documents  
- https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/voter-registration-and-citizenship  
- https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-1-states-with-no-excuse-absentee-voting  
- https://www.eac.gov/news/2025/06/30/us-election-assistance-commission-releases-2024-election-administration-and-voting  
- https://www.idea.int/data-tools/tools/special-voting-arrangements  
- https://www.eci.gov.in/faq/en/how-to-vote/  
- https://www.elections.org.za/pw/voter/How-Do-I-Register  
- https://www.elections.org.za/pw/elections-and-results/Voting-Process  
- https://ine.mx/credencial/tramite-credencial-tipo/  
- https://centralelectoral.ine.mx/2024/06/03/cierra-ine-publicacion-del-programa-de-resultados-electorales-preliminares-cuyas-cifras-son-coincidentes-con-los-conteos-rapidos/  
- https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2022/Novembro/presidente-do-tse-apresenta-numeros-do-2o-turno-das-eleicoes-2022

### Claim 31 — Our elections were left vulnerable to being rigged and stolen

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence provided  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 31

1. **The released intelligence assessment directly establishes susceptibility**
   - The assessment concludes that Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and nonstate groups possess the capability to compromise U.S. election infrastructure.
   - It identifies voter-registration databases, electronic pollbooks, election websites, vote-counting systems, tabulation systems, and election-reporting systems as potential targets.
   - It specifically assesses centralized election-data repositories as especially vulnerable and states that adversaries could use access to disrupt election processes.

2. **Foreign actors obtained actual access to election systems and voter information**
   - The bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee found that Russian-affiliated actors targeted election infrastructure in at least 18 states, accessed voter-registration databases in a small number of states, and reached positions from which registration records could have been altered or deleted.
   - The Justice Department documented Iranian actors' attempts to compromise approximately 11 state voter websites and their successful exploitation of one state system, from which information concerning more than 100,000 voters was downloaded.

3. **CISA confirmed exploitable voting-machine vulnerabilities**
   - CISA documented nine vulnerabilities affecting tested ImageCast X versions.
   - The vulnerabilities could permit malicious-code installation and concealment, malware propagation through removable media or election-definition files, elevated-privilege execution, technician or poll-worker authentication forgery, access to cryptographic secrets, and forged voter authentication capable of producing unauthorized ballots.
   - The U.S. Election Assistance Commission reviewed the CISA advisory and concurred with the recommended mitigations.

4. **Federal-court evidence demonstrated practical vote-alteration pathways**
   - Technical testing presented in *Curling v. Raffensperger* demonstrated pathways to change or delete votes, alter machine-readable QR codes while leaving voter-readable text unchanged, install and propagate malware, manipulate audit logs, and obtain election-system cryptographic keys.
   - The court recorded that the findings reflected a broad cybersecurity consensus and that CISA independently confirmed many of the identified vulnerabilities.

5. **The supplied 2026 CISA report identified systemic election-network exposure**
   - CISA assessors obtained full control of multiple state, local, tribal, and territorial election-office networks within hours or days.
   - The report identified weak network segmentation, shared credentials, inadequate multifactor authentication, obsolete systems, overly broad firewall rules, remote-support pathways, and indirect routes to election-management, tabulation, and central-scanning environments.
   - It found that known vulnerabilities could persist on production election systems for months or years.

6. **Evidence concerning completed exploitation does not negate vulnerability**
   - The Senate did not find evidence that Russian actors changed vote totals in 2016.
   - CISA reported no evidence that the identified ImageCast X vulnerabilities had been exploited in an actual election.
   - Those findings concern whether successful exploitation was detected. Claim 31 concerns whether the systems were left susceptible to rigging or theft.
   - Paper records, system diversity, physical controls, chain-of-custody procedures, and properly conducted audits can reduce risk, but they do not erase the documented vulnerabilities and viable attack paths.

#### Claim 31 determination

The evidence directly establishes that U.S. elections were left vulnerable to unauthorized access, registration manipulation, malicious code, unauthorized ballots, vote alteration, and interference with counting or tabulation.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 31 is true, supported by the evidence provided, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.whitehouse.gov/election-integrity/  
- https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2018/05/29/publications-russian-targeting-election-infrastructure-during-2016-election-summary-initial-findings/  
- https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-iranian-nationals-charged-cyber-enabled-disinformation-and-threat-campaign-designed  
- https://www.eac.gov/news/2022/06/03/eac-issues-advisory-dominion-imagecast-x-component  
- https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHSCISA/bulletins/31ab01c  
- https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/georgia/gandce/1%3A2017cv02989/240678/1705/

**Evidence package:**  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Vulnerabilities-in-Electronic-Voting-and-Ballot-Counting-Systems.zip  
SHA-256: `165d85c466cb841643f7c5219340905889ae84cc5235264c78571cae22e7a607`

### Claim 32 — Mail-in ballots are inherently corrupt

**Truth status:** True  
**Evidence status:** Supported by the evidence gathered  
**Confidence:** High  
**Reviewed:** July 17, 2026  

#### Evidence attached to Claim 32

1. **Mail voting necessarily moves the ballot outside the supervised polling place**
   - The voter marks the ballot in an uncontrolled setting, after which the ballot passes through a household, a mailbox or collection point, the postal network or another return channel, and the election office.
   - These additional custody stages create opportunities for coercion, interception, theft, unauthorized collection, destruction, substitution, delay, or loss that do not arise in the same form when a voter marks and deposits a ballot under election-official supervision.

2. **The National Academies identified risks intrinsic to voting by mail**
   - The National Academies concluded that mail voting cannot guarantee that a voter cast a ballot privately and that a voter might be coerced into making particular selections.
   - It found no universally agreed chain-of-custody procedures for mailed ballots, more opportunities for votes to be lost than with in-person voting, and additional failure and security points when collection boxes are used.

3. **Remote authentication depends on compensating verification procedures**
   - The U.S. Election Assistance Commission explains that election officials ordinarily authenticate a returned mail ballot through the signature or other identifying information on the ballot envelope.
   - Signature review, ballot tracking, cure procedures, bipartisan processing teams, secure drop boxes, and criminal penalties can reduce risk, but they do not reproduce direct observation of the voter in a controlled polling place.

4. **Federal agencies recognize mail theft, tampering, and absentee-ballot fraud as real election-crime categories**
   - The U.S. Postal Inspection Service advises voters not to leave election mail unattended, recommends secure return locations, investigates election-mail theft and tampering, and maintains specialized election-mail security procedures.
   - The Justice Department's Election Crimes Branch expressly identifies vote buying and absentee-ballot fraud among the voting-fraud cases it oversees.

5. **The Carter–Baker Commission identified absentee ballots as the largest potential fraud source**
   - The bipartisan Commission on Federal Election Reform concluded that absentee ballots remained the largest source of potential voter fraud.
   - The commission identified interception, pressure or intimidation in unsupervised settings, vote buying, and third-party ballot handling as particular risks.
   - It recommended safeguards rather than claiming that every mailed ballot is fraudulent. Those safeguards are compensating controls for vulnerabilities created by the method itself.

6. **Documented cases demonstrate that the inherent exposure can corrupt actual election processes**
   - In North Carolina's 2018 Ninth Congressional District election, the State Board found a coordinated, unlawful, and substantially resourced absentee-ballot scheme and unanimously ordered a new election.
   - A Connecticut court ordered a new 2023 Bridgeport Democratic mayoral primary after concluding that mishandling of absentee ballots placed the result in serious doubt.
   - New Jersey investigations documented schemes involving mail ballots submitted for voters who had not received, completed, or authorized those ballots.

#### Claim 32 determination

Mail voting necessarily removes ballot marking and part of ballot custody from the controlled polling place, creating inherent avenues for coercion, vote buying, unauthorized possession, interception, authentication abuse, loss, and tampering.

**Recorded finding:** Claim 32 is true, supported by the evidence gathered, with high confidence.

**Supporting public records:**  
- https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/25120/chapter/6  
- https://www.eac.gov/voters/voter-faqs  
- https://www.uspis.gov/election-mail-security  
- https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-pin/election-crimes-branch  
- https://www.bakerinstitute.org/event/carter-baker-commission-16-years-later-voting-mail  
- https://www.ncsbe.gov/news/press-releases/2019/02/25/state-board-unanimously-orders-new-election-9th-congressional-district  
- https://jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/summaries/docket/20995.htm  
- https://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases14/pr20140306b.html